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Human Rights, Accounting, and the Dialectic of Equality and Inequality 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose - The UN Guiding Principles locate human rights at the centre of the corporate 
social responsibility agenda and provide a substantial platform for the development of 
business and human rights policy and practice. The initiative gives opportunity and focus for 
the rethinking and reconfiguration of corporate accountability for human rights. It also 
presents a threat: The danger, as we see it, is that the Guiding Principles are interpreted and 
implemented in an uncritical way, on a “humanitarian” model of imposed expertise. The 
critical and radical democratic communities have tended to be, perhaps rightly, suspicious of 
rights talk and sceptical of any suggestion that rights and the discourse of human rights can 
play a progressive role. The aim of this paper is to explore these issues from a radical 
perspective.  
 
Design/methodology/approach - This paper uses insights taken from Jacques Rancière’s 
work to argue that there is vital critical potential in human rights. There is an obvious 
negativity to Rancière’s thought insofar as it conceives of the political as a challenge to the 
existing social order. The positive dimension to his work, which has its origins in his 
commitment to and tireless affirmation of the fact of equality, is equally important, if perhaps 
less obvious. Together the negative and positive moments provide a dynamic conception of 
human rights and a dialectical view of the relation between human rights and the social order, 
which enables us to overcome much of the criticism levelled at human rights by certain 
theorists. 
 
Findings - Rancière’s conception of the political puts human rights inscriptions, and the 
traces of equality they carry, at the heart of progressive politics. We close the paper with a 
discussion of the role that accounting for human rights can play in such a democratic politics, 
and by urging, on that basis, the critical accounting community to cautiously embrace the 
opportunity presented by the Guiding Principles. 
 
Originality/value – This paper has some novelty in its application of Rancière’s thinking on 
political theory to the problems of critical accounting and in particular the critical potential of 
accounting and human rights. The paper makes a theoretical contribution to a critical 
understanding of the relationship between accounting, human rights, and democracy.    
 
Keywords Human rights, accounting, politics, democracy, humanitarianism. 
 
Paper type Conceptual paper  
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Human Rights, Accounting, and the Dialectic of Equality and Inequality 
 
Introduction 
In recent decades there has been growing recognition of the human rights impacts of business. 
This has been accompanied by increasing concern about the adequacy of the mechanisms 
available for holding corporations responsible for their human rights impacts. The tacit social 
contract established in the post war period allocated responsibility for generating wealth to 
corporations and for protecting and promoting rights to states. On this model, the relevant 
obligations of a corporation were “assumed to be limited to meeting the human rights laws 
and regulations set out by the states” (Cragg, 2012a, p. 15). This model has been put under 
increasing strain by the processes of globalisation, and in particular by heightened awareness 
of “governance gaps” and the generally limited capacities of nation states to control the 
activities of multinational corporations through their law. One impact of globalisation is to 
force some reconsideration of this tacit contract and some re-evaluation of the responsibilities 
of corporations. 
It was in this context of growing awareness of the need for a new social contract 
concerning business and human rights (Cragg, 2000), and the failure of the “Draft Norms” 
initiative to win United Nations (UN) approval for the imposition of direct human rights 
obligations, in international law, on corporations (UN, 2003), that Kofi Annan, then UN 
Secretary-General, gave Professor John G. Ruggie the task of “clarifying the respective roles 
of states and businesses in safeguarding” human rights (Ruggie, 2013, p. xi). After more than 
six years of intensive research and wide consultation, and working to a significantly 
expanded mandate, the efforts of Ruggie and his team culminated in the production of the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and their endorsement by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council (UN, 2011 & 2012). 
The Guiding Principles are grounded in the extant human rights framework of the UN, 
including the International Bill of Human Rights (UN, 1996) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO, 1998). 
They apply to all states and all business enterprises and have quickly become key reference 
point for any consideration of human rights and business. They have won support from civil 
society and the business world, ranging from organizations such as Oxfam (2013) to the 
United States Council for International Business (2014). A number of international 
governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, working to promote 
responsible corporate behaviour, have amended their guidance frameworks to take account of 
the Guiding Principles.1 And, whilst they themselves are not legally binding, they provide 
normative guidance for the development of law and policy, and respect for them is beginning 
to be incorporated in the law of many states (UN, 2014; EC, 2011; UK, 2013). 
The Guiding Principles articulate in some detail the responsibilities of all businesses in 
respect of human rights, including the requirement for the setting up of policies and processes 
to enable the enterprise to know and manage the human rights risks associated with their 
activities, to undertake due diligence to give assurance that their activities will not infringe 
human rights, and to institute mechanisms to mitigate and redress any adverse impacts on 
human rights of their activities and relationships, including those with suppliers, business 
partners, and governments. Accountability, the capacity to “know and show” (UN, 2011, p. 
16) that the corporation respects human rights is fundamental to the Guiding Principles. For 
Ruggie, the “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” principle (Griffin, 2006, p. 35) applies to responsibilities 
                                                            
1  These include, for example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011), the Global Reporting Initiative’s reporting framework (GRI, 2013), the 
International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 26000 (ISO, 2010), and the International Finance Corporation’s 
Performance Standards (IFC, 2012a&b). 
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for human rights, and he associates responsibilities of corporations with their risk 
management capabilities (see Cragg, 2012b). He argues, for example, that expertise 
developed in the performance of “transactional due diligence” can inform development of 
due diligence for human rights (Ruggie, 2013, p. 99).  
The Guiding Principles provide a substantial platform for the development of business 
and human rights policy and practice; they locate human rights at heart of corporate social 
responsibility and accountability debates (see Hazelton, 2013), and they put due diligence and 
accountability at the centre of the business and human rights agenda. They present an open 
invitation for accountants and others with relevant expertise in due diligence and risk 
management to apply their skills to help promote and realize corporate respect for human 
rights. There is an opportunity here but many would see dangers too: Firstly, many critics 
argue that there is no real emancipatory potential in the discourse of human rights. Some 
would go so far as to claim that no matter how well-intentioned and carefully designed 
corporate due diligence for human rights may be, it will serve ultimately to reinforce 
oppressive structures of the existing social order. Secondly, there are critics who warn that 
the importation of expertise into areas where judgement of responsibility and right are in 
question, invites corruption and even annulment of the political space as it is colonised by 
professional routines and technologies. 
  Power (1991) warns us of the capacity of audit expertise to “colonise and 
“technologise”” (p. 30) areas such as corporate social responsibility, and to impose narrow 
conceptions of accountability reflecting the pre-understandings and limited imaginaries of 
experts. Power recognizes that many problems do call for an appropriate deployment of 
technology. Nevertheless he reminds us that corporate social responsibility is also “political”, 
and he suggests that we should be careful not to allow such a “political arena to be the sole 
preserve of self-appointed experts such as accountants” (p. 31). Similar misgivings 
concerning the impact of accountants and accounting on corporate social responsibility have 
been expressed by many commentators over the years, including by notable advocates of 
social accounting such as Perks and Gray, 1979; O’ Dwyer, 2001; and Adams and Evans, 
2004. 
The critical accounting community has been highly sceptical of corporate social and 
environmental accounting, and inclined to characterize it as playing an essentially ideological 
role; “perpetuating unequal and exploitative social relations” (Everett & Neu, 2000, p. 5). 
Puxty (1986) dismisses it as a “systematically distorted communication” (p. 98) captured by 
and serving to sustain and reproduce the dominant order. Cooper et al., (p. 954), follow the 
same line, and with Puxty contend that corporate social accounting gives no challenge to the 
powerful and potentially reinforces their dominance; “since it leaves the basic structures in 
place, and can even lead to their legitimization” (Puxty, 1991, p. 37). They argue, that if we 
want social accounts with real political effectiveness, able to “disrupt the current ideology”, 
they “should be produced independently of the management of organizations” (Cooper et al., 
2005, p. 951). The idea that the emancipatory potential and intent of the social accounting 
project needs to be realized through accounts emanating outside business corporations drives 
the support given by critical academics to the development of counter reporting and shadow 
accounting projects, of various kinds, generated in civil society; see for example Gallhofer et 
al., (2006), Dey (2007), and Thomson et al., (2015). 
Spence (2009) has a broadly similar view: He insists that corporate social accounting 
currently obfuscates “the contradictions within capitalism” (p. 205), yet argues that an 
emancipatory social accounting is possible and “is already being undertaken in different 
forms … not … by corporations but by civil society organisations” (p. 205). These 
emancipatory accounts include, he suggests, academic criticism of corporate social accounts, 
and a wide range of activist “anti-accounts” (p.217) designed to debunk corporate rhetoric. 
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The examples Spence reviews include the work of organizations such as Accountability 
International, the Centre for Corporate Accountability,  CorpWatch, which publicly critique 
corporate behaviour over a wide range of issues, in sometimes innovative ways such the 
CorpWatch spoof awards for top “greenwashers”. He recognizes, as forms of social 
accounting, “adbusting”, where corporate advertising billboards and slogans are altered to 
humorous and critical effect, and “culture jamming” including the work of activists such as 
the “Yes Men” who routinely masquerade as corporate leaders and spokespersons, perhaps 
most notoriously when they posed as representatives of Dow Chemical Company and falsely 
announced that the victims of the Bhopal disaster were to receive compensation from the 
company. Spence has high hopes for such alternative social accounting; he sees it having “the 
potential and intent to create a fissure in current structural arrangements, paving the way for a 
re-organisation of society along more humane and ecologically sensitive parameters” (pp. 
206-207). 
Spence follows Ernesto Laclau (2000, 2005) in taking a neo-Gramscian view of politics 
as hegemony, a matter of constructing alliances and coalitions and thereby building particular 
political demands into a force with sufficient coherence to unsettle the dominant hegemony. 
He identifies two necessary aspects to this political process of building a countervailing 
hegemony. The first is the critical exposure of the contingency and contradictions of the 
dominant hegemony. The second is the construction of alliances the “articulation and 
dissemination of an alternative hegemonic project that is capable of re-aligning the current 
historical bloc around different power interests” (p. 217). In his discussion of alternative 
social accounts Spence deals only with the first element; the aspect of critique. We have 
considerable sympathy with the neo-Gramscian position adopted by Spence.2 We have no 
faith, however, in the capacity of these “anti-accounts and debunking activities of civil 
society organisations … to prise open the historic block” (Spence, p. 224). We recognize that 
they may have local value, but we can see in them no prospect for the formation of a 
challenge to the universal system of capitalism; in fact, no prospect that they can be 
articulated to seriously trouble the dominant capitalist order. 
The alternative social accountings described by Spence, seem to us to be firmly under the 
sway of what Srnicek and Williams (2015, p. 3) call “folk-political thinking”, characterised 
by “the fetishisation of local spaces, immediate actions, transient gestures, and particularisms 
of all kinds” (p. 3). They argue that this kind of political thinking underlies the recent cycles 
of failed and failing political struggle, including the anti-globalisation, anti-war, and Occupy 
movements. These movements, and activities such as anti-accounting, ad-busting, and 
culture-jamming, can have important effects on local struggles but are essentially insufficient 
if the goal is emancipatory systemic change: “we deceive ourselves when we think these are 
turning the tide against global capitalism” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.12).  It is essentially 
defensive and reactive, a politics of resistance “incapable of articulating or building a new 
world” (2015, p. 3). 
Folk politics may have real transformative effects on those who participate in it, and can 
represent significant local intervention, nevertheless it fails to mark a path to structural 
transformation, fails to make the linkages from the local to the global or to “synthesise the 
particular with the universal” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.12). Politics always “begins from 
the local” the problem with folk-politics is that it is “content to remain at (and even privileges) 
that level – of the transient, the small-scale, the unmediated and the particular” (Srnicek & 
Williams, 2015, p.12). Spence talks of working from “the ground up” (p. 224), the problem is 
that whilst he identifies the second aspect of hegemonic politics as the articulation of 
                                                            
2  See Bowman (2007) for a discussion of the close relationship between the political thought of Laclau and Rancière. 
Bowman concludes: “Each adds a lot to the understanding of the other. The question is which one is to be understood 
in the terms of which other” (Bowman, p. 544). 
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particulars and the formation of a countervailing hegemony, he does not explain how the folk 
political activities he describes can build into a challenge to capitalism.  Spence sets this task 
aside, “for reasons of space” (2009, p. 217), we suggest that it simply is not possible. The 
local contingency of folk politics undermines from the start the possibility of constructing 
any universal politics; and universal politics is what we need to challenge neo-liberal 
capitalism. 
Capitalism itself is unremittingly expansionist, and aggressively universal. The  
“defensive game(s)” of folk-politics, including anti-accounts, spoofs, and de-bunkings,  can 
have little effect “against an uncompromising and incessantly encroaching capitalism” 
(Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 69). Universal capitalism has demonstrated an enormous 
capacity to absorb particular critiques and resistances and has shown itself able to coexist, 
and adapt to the particulars of context:   It has amply demonstrated that “particularisms are, in 
themselves, incapable of competing against a universalism” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 
70). If capitalism is to be superseded on a global scale, the challenge must be anchored in 
equally expansive and inclusive universals. In our view, the universality of an expansive 
vision of human need, interest, and rights, is the most promising foundation for fundamental 
challenge to capitalism. Vivek Chibber (2014) makes the point very clearly: 
 
“Hence, if there is any genuine source of opposition to capitals universalizing drive, it 
is the equally universal struggle by subaltern classes to defend their basic humanity. 
That is the core motivation in all those thousands of campaigns for wages, land rights, 
basic health, and security, dignity, self-determination, autonomy, and so forth—all 
those Enlightenment concepts against which postcolonial theorists inveigh.” 
(Chibber, 2014, p. 233) 
 
It should also be clear that any effective challenge to capitalism needs to be directed at 
the economic base of the system. It is at its economic foundations that we find the 
contradictions of capitalism that Spence (2009) is keen to see a social accounting reveal, and 
it is at its base that the clash of universals is sharpest. Again Chibber’s analysis is powerfully 
on the mark: “capital is driven to dominate labor wherever it takes root, and if this 
domination generates palpable harm to workers’ physical integrity through dangerous work 
conditions, poverty-level wages, high mortality, ill health, environmental hazards, and so 
on—then workers will be motivated to undertake steps to defend their basic interest in their 
welfare” (2014, p. 203). Spence’s turn to folk politics is a turn away from direct engagement 
with the economic base of capital and from the confrontation of capital and the human rights 
as universals.3 
We do not intend to suggest that the universal conceptions, for example universal human 
rights, should be understood as somehow natural, transcendent, or otherwise fixed. We are in 
agreement with Laclau (2000) that the universal emerges through the articulation and re-
articulation of the particular in hegemonic struggle: “The universal, then, is an empty 
placeholder that hegemonic particulars (specific demands, ideals and collectives) come to 
occupy” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 78). As a politically effective notion the meaning of 
the universal must remain open to contest and to revision: “It can operate as a subversive and 
emancipatory vector of change with respect to established universalisms” (Srnicek & 
Williams, 2015, p. 78). We argue that human rights deployed as a universal can be at the 
                                                            
3  Spence’s call for a turn away from the economic base is clear: “If the social accounting project is to be geared towards 
emancipation then, from the Gramscian perspective presented here, it must take a ‘civil society’ turn and start to think 
about ways in which accounting can contribute to an invigorated public sphere outwith the direct influence of the 
economic base” (2009, p. 224). It is surely a misguided turn if the object remains, as it seem to be for Spence, the 
challenging of the neo-liberal order. 
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heart of the construction of political challenge to global capitalism, and that accounting for 
human rights can be part of the action. 
In this paper we respond to the scepticism we refer to above, and defend the critical 
potential of accounting for human rights. We encourage accounting professionals to take the 
opportunity presented by the Guiding Principles. Through the work of Jacques Rancière, we 
articulate a critical conception of the potential of accountability for human rights; arguing 
that the inscriptions and form of human rights carry real emancipatory potential, and that 
corporate accounting for human rights can open a space for the staging of the political. 
Rancière’s thought holds together powerful negative and positive dimensions. On the one 
hand there is the rigorous negativity of his conception of the political in terms of a radical 
challenge to the prevailing social order. On the other hand there is the positivity of his 
untiring commitment to, and affirmation of, the fact of equality. Together they provide us 
with a dynamic conception of human rights and a dialectical view of the relation between 
human rights and the social order.   
We begin by considering some of the criticism that has been levelled at human rights in 
practice, by theorists of the left including Douzinas, Arendt and Agamben, and move on to 
explain Rancière’s response. We proceed in a succeeding section of the paper to explore 
Rancière’s conception of the political and the role of human rights and accountability within 
it. Our initial emphasis is on the negative and on the role that human rights inscriptions and 
claims can have in challenging the social order. We proceed to explore the positive moment 
in Rancière’s conception of the relation between politics and the social order, and in the 
potential for the development of a positive dialectic of “equality and inequality” (Deranty, 
2003, p.153) within which each new political dispute “produces both new inscriptions of 
equality within liberty and a fresh sphere of visibility for further demonstrations” (Rancière, 
1999, p.  40). A dialectic within which each political event leaves new inscriptions of equality; 
traces of equality in the social order which “however fragile and fleeting such inscriptions 
may be” (p. 40) can be built on. In the final part of the paper we explore the implications of 
Rancière thought for social accounting and in particular accounting for human rights. We 
elucidate our conclusions through critical comparison with the implications that have been 
drawn for accounting from certain other strands of radical democratic thinking. 
 
The danger of humanitarianism 
A concern for human rights seems now to be taking a central place in the corporate 
responsibility and accountability agenda, but just at a time when confidence in the 
emancipatory potential of a human rights approach seems to be dwindling, almost vanishing, 
in some critical circles. Many see human rights as helping to sustain and reproduce relations 
of oppression and domination in contemporary society (Brown, 1995). Historically, there is 
little doubt that important advances have been made through the praxis of human rights. In 
recent times, however, the discourse of human rights has become, associated with the dubious 
legitimation of humanitarian intervention and violence (Chesterman, 2012). Even some of the 
strongest supporters and advocates of the human rights approach see a “dark side” (Kennedy, 
2004) to it which threatens to undermine it exactly when it is taken up as a practical project.  
Douzinas wonders whether human rights are now anything more than “the ideological 
gloss of an emerging empire” (2007, p. 7), and questions whether their emancipatory power 
and function can in fact be reclaimed. The answer for Douzinas seem to be a very qualified 
yes, but only if human rights as utopian ideal can somehow, through critique, be uncoupled 
from their ideological role as a buttress to global capitalism, and returned, against the advice 
of the moralist and humanitarians, to “the tradition of resistance and struggle” (Douzinas, 
2007, p. 293). Douzinas wants human rights activists to reclaim and confine themselves to 
the role of idealist critics; working from the outside of the system. However, the trend in 
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humanitarian practice seems to be moving away from the separation of idealist and realist and 
towards fuller convergence: “Humanitarians and statesmen - idealists and realists - are in the 
same game, and are increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 
336). 
In his influential study of the development of humanitarian practice David Kennedy 
argues that whilst earlier generations of humanitarians, for example those of the Vietnam war 
era, were content to criticize power from an external perspective, in recent times 
humanitarians have come to accept, but not without difficulty and resistance, that  to be 
effective they must work from the inside and speak “in a vocabulary common to … the 
military or political leadership they seek to restrain” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 272). As Douzinas 
sees it, “The dissidents have stopped marching and protesting. Instead they have become bit 
players in governmental policymaking and even in military planning” (Douzinas, 2007, p. 60). 
Kennedy on the other hand, thoroughly approves of the trend and sees in it humanitarianism’s 
coming of age in recognition of the fact that effectiveness and responsibility entails 
engagement with power. He urges humanitarian activists and policy-makers to face-up to 
their involvement in governance, their power and their responsibility: “There is scarcely a 
humanitarian practice which does not act as if governance were elsewhere … And yet we do 
rule, exercise power, affect distributions among people. … Let us no longer avert our eyes 
from rulership” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 348). 
Where Douzinas calls for a reclaiming of the dissident voice of human rights, Kennedy 
urges the humanitarian elite to push on and complete the convergence project; press on for 
the convergence of idealism and realism and until “the humanitarian vocabulary becomes a 
dominant global ideology of legitimacy” (2004, p. 277). Kennedy is most directly concerned 
with the military-humanitarian nexus, but arguably precisely the same analysis can be applied 
to the business-human-rights complex now emerging. Business executives and managers, 
investors and investment organizations, human rights lawyers, auditors and other 
professionals with human rights impact and risk analysis expertise to offer, the officers of 
certain international governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, 
government and local government officials with a human rights brief, and academics 
concerned with the corporate social responsibility, can all be part of the construction and 
promotion of a global ideology of human rights and business as expressed in a common 
vocabulary: The Guiding Principles seem to be part of that vocabulary, a new global ideology 
of human rights and business - in the making. Furthermore, just as “a pragmatic merger of 
military and humanitarian roles has allegedly led the military to ‘best practice’” (Douzinas, 
2007, p. 62), the convergence of idealism and realism in human rights and business will 
change practice.  New conceptions of best practice are already becoming expressed in expert 
driven initiatives such as the human rights section of the Global Reporting Initiative’s 
reporting framework  (GRI, 2013), and the Reporting Framework for the UN Guiding 
Principles Reporting recently developed in cooperation involving an international firm of 
accountants (NGO Shift & Mazars, 2015).    
Douzinas insists that we should resist any cooption of the radical spirit of human rights:  
“We must defend, therefore, the radical do-gooders, the marginal pacifists, the anti-war and 
anti-globalisation protesters and all those who, Bartleby-like, ‘would prefer not to’ become 
scriveners for the elites and accountants of power” (2007, p. 66). As he sees it, it is in these 
dissonant voices speaking in vocabularies that government, the military, and business are not 
comfortable with, that the value and potential of “human rights” lies: For Douzinas, it is with 
these external, even marginal voices, and not with the pragmatic ideologues of the new order 
of humanitarianism and human rights, that “the principle of hope that human rights feebly 
represent today” rests (p.66). 
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We are sceptical of the folk politics of resistance from the side-lines, that Douzinas 
seems to recommend, and are inclined to hope for some alternative to the poles of Bartelby-
like ennui and the cooption to empire. We have considerable sympathy with Denike’s critique 
of Douzinas’s position and in particular with her suggestion that the “severity of his critique 
seems to overwhelm the prospect of hope and to conceal the functional and effective 
strategies of human rights claims to ameliorate specific inequalities” (2008 , p. 175). 
Nevertheless, his effort to reinvigorate the radical spirit of human rights and his challenge, in 
that spirit, to the pragmatist opportunism and lure of “rulership” championed by Kennedy is 
of vital importance. The danger that capitalism will go on absorbing and effectively 
nullifying the challenge of human rights is real. Political work will be required to realise the 
emancipatory, and not merely amelioratory, potential of the universal conception of human 
rights. Academics and activists especially have a responsibility to support the “critical 
performance” (see Spicer et al., 2009) of the practice of human rights and business so that it 
remains open as an emancipatory vector: This will require “making ‘normal’what is currently 
abnormal or unthinkable” (Cabantous, et al, 2015, p. 14). Work will be required to keep 
vocabulary of human rights and business “alive”, open and mobile, and to ensure that radical 
edge of human rights claims and inscriptions do not become blunted by the sedimentation of 
stifled techniques and process. Our primary objective in this paper, however, is not to explore 
the performativity of corporate accountability for human rights.  
Our aim is to convince the reader of the possibility of an emancipatory politics of 
corporate accountability for human rights. Douzinas is right to insist that a radical and 
effective practice of human rights cannot begin with the human rights professionals of 
whatever stripe, radical or pragmatic. The energy,  insight and creativity “necessary for the 
protection, horizontal proliferation and vertical expansion of human rights comes from below, 
from those whose lives have been blighted by oppression or exploitation” (2007, p. 66). In 
considering the application of human rights to business we need to “begin” with oppression 
and domination, with social suffering, and we need a politics, at every level, that can support 
this. Douzinas, however, takes a pessimistic view of the relationship between human rights 
and politics in modern society. Very much influenced by the thinking of Arendt and 
Agamben, his fear is that the political is closed in contemporary western societies, that 
substantial social change is blocked, and that human rights are one of the institutions 
responsible for this closure: “the main contemporary effect of human rights is to depoliticise 
politics itself” (Douzinas, 2007, p. 102). We will use Rancière’s work to argue against this 
pessimism and to begin to articulate a politics of accountability for human rights.  
 
Human rights and the political 
Rancière (2010) stands on its head the tradition which takes human right to be a worthless 
empty abstractions. That tradition, which goes back at least to Edmund Burke (1790, p. 46), 
and runs on through Marx (1844; see Lefort, 1986, p. 245ff), has been revived in recent times, 
most famously by Hannah Arendt (1951). Witnessing the plight of refugees in the twentieth 
century, she argues that the only real rights are citizens’ rights: The concept of human rights, 
as those rights we have in virtue of merely being human “broke down at the very moment 
when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who 
had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still 
human” (1951, p. 299).  The rights of man are then, on this view, revealed as the “rights” of 
those who, in effect, have no rights; they are the “rights” of those radically excluded from 
citizenship and the powers and real rights that go with it.  As Arendt sees it the real calamity 
of the refugees, the rightless, “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law 
exists for them” (Arendt, 1951, p. 293): They were outside the polis, outside the public 
sphere and subsisting in realm of “mere givenness” (Arendt, 1951, p. 310), a realm of “bare 
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life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 133). They had lost the “right to have rights” (Arendt, 1951, p. 296), 
lost their place as members of a political community. For Arendt, human rights signal 
exclusion from the political. 
Georgio Agamben (1998) builds on, and radicalizes Arendt’s critique of human rights. 
He agrees that we should stop thinking of human rights declarations as proclamations of 
transcendent values binding states “to respect eternal ethical principles” (1998, p. 75). For 
Agamben human rights today do not, so much, emancipate or protect us (or fail to do so), as 
serve to subordinate life to sovereign power. In the modern state, as Agamben sees it, human 
rights, are essentially biopolitical rights, rights through which modern states, concerned 
above all to control and regulate the biological lives of their populations, exercise control: 
“Declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscription of natural life in the 
juridico-political order of the nation-state” (1998, p. 75). On this view, rather than think of 
human rights as a defence against power, we should recognize them as one of the means by 
which power, biopower, is brought to bear on individuals and populations: “the rights won by 
individuals in their conflicts  with certain powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but 
increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new  and 
more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which  they wanted to liberate 
themselves” (Agamben, 1998, p. 72). 
Agamben, then sees politics as having collapsed into a confrontation, a controlling 
relation, between bare life and sovereign power. The paradigmatic case of this collapse of the 
political is identified as Germany under National Socialism where in the camps sovereign 
power confronted bare life stripped of all protection. The camps, for Agamben, are not 
historical anomalies but rather they are emblematic of modernity: the “hidden matrix and 
nomos of the political space in which we are still living” (1998, p. 95). The inhabitant of the 
camps and citizens become virtually indistinguishable, as bare life utterly exposed to power 
and “stripped of every political status” (1998, p. 97). Whilst for Arendt human rights are 
empty abstractions, Agamben goes a step further and identifies them as a “dreadful 
foundation” of sovereign power; leaving us stranded in a depoliticized sphere, beyond any 
possibility of political conflict proper, beyond dissensus.  On this grim view, political practice, 
claims to rights and struggles to enact rights, turn out “to be always already caught in the 
biopolitical trap” (Rancière, 2010, p. 66).  
Rancière suggests that in order to escape this trap we need to rethink politics and the 
subject of human rights (Rancière, 2010, p. 67). The subject that Rancière has in mind is the 
political subject as “a capacity for staging scenes of dissensus” (2010, p. 69). This subject is 
not the transcendental autonomous individual of the Cartesian or Kantian traditions, nor is it a 
particular collection of individuals. The political subject is always appears as a surplus to any 
“definite collectivities”, a surplus posing “a question or a dispute (litige) about who is 
included in their count” (2010, p. 68). Likewise, political predicates such as freedom, equality, 
and the rights of man are not definite belongings of any pre-existing subject, individual or 
collective; Rather, they always “open up a dispute about what they entail, whom they concern 
and in which cases” (2010, p. 68). In Rancière’s view, Agamben’s thinking is unable to grasp 
the real logic of political subjectivation: He fails to see that political subjects are always 
“surplus subjects that inscribe the count of the uncounted as a supplement” (p.70). For 
Rancière politics proper, separates the community from itself, from its own consensus, and 
the political subject, as “the part of those who have no part” (2010, p. 70) in that consensus, is 
the agent that stages the dissensus. 
This subject breaks free of the quandary into which Arendt and Agamben sink human 
rights, when they cast them as the rights of those without rights, by treating them instead as 
“the rights of those who have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have 
not” (2010, p. 67). Rancière’s idea is that the political subject can bridge the gap between 
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rights as inscription and declaration, and rights realized. Those who are deprived of rights can 
at the same time have those rights insofar as they make use of them in political action; by 
claiming, testing and contesting the inscription of rights: “the Rights of Man are the rights of 
those who make something of that inscription, deciding not only to 'use' their rights but also 
to build cases to verify the power of the inscription” (2010, p. 68). The rights of man, human 
rights, then become the rights of those who make something of them. Rancière gives the 
example of women like Olympe de Gouge who during the French revolution contested the 
limits and meaning of the rights of “man”, arguing famously that: “if women were entitled to 
go to the scaffold, then they were also entitled to go to the assembly” (p. 68). On the scaffold 
the universality of the guillotine, equality before the death penalty, undermines distinctions 
between men and women, the political and the domestic, and propels an affirmation of 
women’s right to equality as “citizens”,  a demonstration, in terms of Rancière’s formula, that 
women did not have the rights they had and had the rights they did not have:  
 
“On the one hand, women were deprived of the rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights, 
those that belonged to all 'free and equal' men and demanded to have these rights denied to 
them. On the other, through their very protest, these women demonstrated a political capacity. 
They showed that since they could enact those rights, they actually possessed them” (2010c, p. 
57). 
   
The power of rights lies in the bridging of universal inscription and particular application. 
Human rights take their power from the dialectic between declaration and realization in 
political struggle: their strength lies in “the back-and-forth movement between the initial 
inscription of the right and the dissensual stage on which it is put to the test” (2010, p. 71). It 
is important that we maintain such a dialectical orientation to human rights and the subject of 
human rights, and that we develop practices including practices of accounting for human 
rights, that allows the dissensual stage to be sustained and developed. Arendt’s thoroughly 
undialectical view of human rights which makes them the rights of an individual definitive 
permanent subject who can “only use the rights actually possessed” and who can easily be 
shown not to exist (2010, p. 67), depopulates the dissensual stage. Agamben, similarly, 
sweeps the actors from the “political stage” (Rancière, 2010, p. 66) leaving us with neomorts 
and the muselmann.4 
For Agamben and many theorists of the left, including Marx himself (Wood, 2004, ch. 9), 
rights tend to be seen as a juridical product of the dominant regime and, notwithstanding their 
potential to ameliorate certain local excesses, as one of the mechanisms by which domination 
is sustained (see Hardt and Negri, 2000, p. 36). For Rancière this pessimistic view of human 
rights is “only half the story” (Žižek, 2004): What is missing is a proper recognition of 
emergence of the universal form of human rights and of the political potential of the form. 
Form is never merely form, and carries with it the potential to spark and allow the articulation 
of political claims. The political challenge, of human rights, is to “make something” of the 
formal inscriptions (Rancière, 2010, p. 68): Even in their bourgeois manifestations, the form 
of human rights provides a foundation for political practice, worked through claims to 
equality, that offers a progressive way beyond the present realities of inequality, oppression 
and exploitation. The meaning of human rights inscriptions and their extension and 
comprehension, is always contestable. In raising and pressing rights claims political subjects 
can stage scenes of dissensus in which they can bring inscription of rights “to bear against 
                                                            
4  While Marx argues that the contradictions of capitalism will ultimately give rise to political struggle, in Agamben’s 
work the political is closed down, and in the place of the Marxist vision “of political actors, struggling collectively 
against the system of which they are a product, Agamben’s work is populated by figures whose lives border on death 
and whose extreme manifestations are the Muselmann of the Nazi camps, and the neomort who survives merely by 
virtue of artificial respiratory technologies” (Whyte, 2009, p.  159). 
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situations in which those rights are denied” and “construct the world in which those rights are 
valid” (Rancière, 2010, p. 69). 
We will argue that processes of accountability for human rights, if appropriately 
performed, can carry the inscriptions of dissensus and provide a space within which the 
political can be staged; spaces in which “wrongs” can be disputed (Rancière, 1999, p. 21). In 
our view, the negative moment of dissensus, radical challenge to the established order, needs 
to build into the positive. We find both moments in Rancière’s thought, were there is clear 
recognition that there can be better and worse social orders: “the better one, incidentally, not 
being the one that adheres to the supposedly natural order of society or the science of 
legislators, but the one that all the breaking and entering perpetrated by egalitarian logic has 
most often jolted out of its ‘natural’ logic” (Rancière 1999, p. 31). We need to strike a 
balance in the design and performance of accounting arrangements that can carry forward this 
positive project without entirely undermining dissensus and the means for the disclosure of 
arbitrariness, injustice, in existing arrangement. This latter aspect is increasingly important in 
the circumstances of late modernity where the spontaneous eruption of dissensus, the political, 
is by Rancière’s own admission “rare”. We turn now to a broader consideration of Rancière 
thought and in particular his conception of the political and the emancipatory potential of 
human rights. 
 
Rancière and the dialectic of equality  
Rancière conceives of the social and the political as governed by essentially opposing logics 
of hierarchy and equality respectively.  His “fundamental political concern is the denial of 
recognition experienced by the dominated” (Deranty, 2003, p.137). He brings a new radical 
perspective to this central political issue, of recognition, which we argue can help us in 
rethinking critical accounting with political significance. Rancière borrows from Foucault the 
term “police” to refer to the social order; “the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and 
roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution” (1999, p. 28). Political activity, for 
Rancière, is always essentially “antagonistic to policing” (1999, p. 29); it breaks with and 
reconfigures the established order in terms of the excluded and in the name of a radical 
equality. 
Rancière’s conception of the police refers essentially to the “symbolic constitution of the 
social” (2010, p. 36). Various goods arise from the established social order, and Rancière 
recognizes that “one kind of police may be infinitely preferable to another” (1999, p. 31), 
nevertheless fundamentally it stands in opposition to politics. Its essence lies not in repression 
but in a certain way of dividing up and making up the social world, which Rancière refers to 
as the distribution of the sensible, la partage du sensible; a partitioning of “functions, places 
and ways of being” (2010, p.36). Nevertheless, in the same moment that this partitioning 
makes a place for participation, it separates and excludes: The police partitioning of the 
sensible “is characterized by the absence of void and of supplement” (2010, p.36). It is this 
exclusion of any void, “this exclusion of what 'is not' that constitutes the police-principle” 
(Rancière, 2010, p.36). The police then, whilst constitutive of the social order, always also 
institutes arbitrary exclusions and domination. Politics is not a matter of conflict between 
parts of the social order: Politics happens when the order “is interrupted by the institution of a 
part of those who have no part” (Rancière, 1999, p. 11). 
The essential “equality of any speaking being” (1999, p. 29) is, for Rancière, the 
repressed presumption underpinning every inegalitarian social order: “In the final analysis, 
inequality is only possible through equality” (1999, p. 17). In every hierarchy, every social 
order, some command and others obey, and to be obedient you must both understand the 
command and that it ought to be complied with: “to do that, you must already be the equal of 
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the person who is ordering you” (Rancière, 1999, p. 16). This is an “equality that gnaws away 
at any natural order” (1999, p. 16); it is the secret other and essential basis of hierarchy and 
social order, which if acknowledged, brought to light, will reveal the arbitrariness of 
hierarchy and threaten to undermine it from within. Politics for Rancière is not the various 
efforts made and mechanisms used to preserve the social order or to negotiate interests within 
it: “Politics only occurs when these mechanisms are stopped in their tracks by the effect of a 
presupposition that is totally foreign to them yet without which none of them could ultimately 
function: the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone” (1999, p. 17). It is not in 
the strike that advances the workers interest in more pay, unless that event mobilizes the 
assumption of a radical equality; unless it really stages a confrontation of hierarchy and 
equality which puts the legitimacy of the established order in question; stops it in its tracks. 
This means that no activity is innately political, “for the political only happens by means of a 
principle that does not belong to it: equality” (1999, p. 33), and that any activity can become 
political if it engenders a confrontation of the logics of hierarchy and of equality; if it “give(s) 
rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic” (1999, p. 32).  
The political expresses a principle of radical equality that is essentially antagonistic to 
the hierarchical logic of the social.  It is the radical universalizing assumption of the “equality 
of anyone and everyone” that raises certain struggles to status of the political and gives them 
the a power to challenge and subvert the social order, a power that is lacking, for Rancière, in 
those struggles for social justice which, whilst worthy, operate within the order – such as 
campaigns for fairer wages or better conditions for worker which don’t express a deeper 
assumption of equality, and which therefore remain the expression of the claims of particular 
parts of the social order. The political for Rancière is essentially the moment of disagreement; 
The moment when the logic of hierarchy, the police order of society, is confronted by the 
logic of equality;  the fleeting moment of disruption, the irruption of the part with no part, the 
dominated, that causes a reconfiguration of the social order by questioning its legitimacy, 
challenging the processes of exclusion at its core, and giving visibility and voice to the 
excluded: “Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes 
a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a 
discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what 
was once only heard as noise”  (Rancière, 1999, p. 30). 
This politics is expressed in “nature of political subjects, which are not social groups but 
rather forms of inscription that (ac)count for the unaccounted” (Rancière, 2010, p. 35). 
Politics and political subjects emerge as supplementary to the struggles of various parts of 
society to win advancement and perhaps justice for themselves. It is when the claims of, for 
example, workers, people of particular racial groups, gender or sexuality, or a disadvantaged 
sector, express the premise of universal equality that real politics, as Rancière conceives it, 
happens. True politics exists when such groups and their claims “are identified with subjects 
that inscribe, in the form of a supplement to every count of the parts of society, a specific 
figure of the count of the uncounted or of the part of those without part” (2010, p. 35). 
Politics essentially aims at a reconfiguration of the social, through the production of new 
(ac)counts of the world, its parts, their functions: “Ways of being, ways of doing, and ways of 
saying- or not saying” (Rancière, 1999, p. 27). It entails the institution of a new (ac)counting 
of parts: “new categories that inscribe another (ac)count of the community” (2010, p. 35), one 
that (ac)counts for the part with no part in the established order. The work of (ac)counting, 
inscription and reinscription; the making of thing visible that were invisible, of giving voice 
where there was previously just noise, is at the core of the political: “Politics, before all else, 
is an intervention in the visible and the sayable” (Rancière, 2010, p.36). The political, which 
emerges as a confrontation of “what is” and “what is not”, a challenge of the established 
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order of parts, with the claim of the part without a part: “That this part exists is the very stake 
of politics itself” (Rancière, 2010, p. 35). 
Rancière insists that emancipation can come about only through the agency of dominated 
ordinary subjects, who take seriously democracy, that is the idea of radical equality, and 
through identification with the entire community imagine a new order of emancipation. The 
proper role for the political intellectual, as he sees it, is not to think and speak for the 
oppressed and thus “lead them out of their subjection” (2014, p.11).  The intellectual, and for 
that matter the critical accountant, can help ensure the oppressed are heard and that their story 
is told and retold and their agency and equality affirmed. The role of the intellectual “is not to 
give his/her voice to the silent aspirations of the dominated, but to add his/her voice to theirs, 
therefore, to hear their voices, rather than interpret them, and to help them resound” (Deranty, 
2003, p.137): A critical accounting must hear and make heard the voices of the dominated.  
There is nothing inevitable or predictable about the political, the confrontation of 
hierarchy and equality: it is “by no means necessary … it occurs as an always provisional 
accident within the history of forms of domination” (Rancière, 2010, p. 35). Rancière 
recognizes that tacit acceptance of the social order is the norm, and no less obviously so when 
groups struggle for advantage within the boundaries of that order. Politics “actually happens 
very little or rarely” (1999, p. 17), and then as an “anomaly”, a break with the “normal order 
of things” (Rancière, 2010, p. 35). It has an essentially transitory, unsustainable, quality, 
becoming its other in the moment it is realized in the social, when new counts of the 
community become institutionalized: It “works on the verge of its radical demise, which is 
embodiment as the police, the realization of the political subject as social body” (Rancière, 
1999, p. 91). 
The radical potential of the political relies on its absolute discontinuity with the social 
order and with an associated emptiness: it must “necessarily be socially weightless, as 
unencumbered as possible by any social content in order to have its ruptural, radically 
egalitarian impact” (McNay, 2014, p. 138). Politics is always a response to a wrong in the 
form of a miscounting of the community “a false count, a double count, or a miscount” 
(Rancière, 1999, p. 6). It exists as conflict over the (mis)counting of the community through 
which those who have no part, who are excluded, claim a part and identifying, in the name of 
the wrong they have suffered, with the whole community in a universal egalitarianism, “make 
themselves of some account” (1999, p. 9 and pp. 26-27). It is a moment of negativity 
momentarily inscribed and given form in the (ac)counts of the unaccounted, the claims of the 
dominated, the excluded, the poor. This political and the social order are completely 
heterogeneous; the one being entirely discontinuous with and disruptive of the other.  The 
extreme “negativity” (McNay, 2014, p. 133) of Rancière conception of the political, should 
not be seen as a weakness: “Indeed his main contribution is to isolate and emphasize the 
democratic moment in politics and to denounce all reductions to the social” (Deranty, 2003, 
p.137). It helps free our conceptions of politics and rights from any “reductive ontological 
baggage” (McNay, 2014, p.133), and it reminds us of the dangers associated with the 
normalizing potential of more positive models of politics.  
Notwithstanding the emphasis given to the negative moment, for good reasons, in 
Rancière’s politics there is recognition of the need for enduring positive commitment to 
political events and their legacies: Each political challenge to the arbitrariness, the injustice, 
of the social order lays down inscriptions of equality which provide purchase for future 
claims, future political action, and the development of a progressive, positive, dialectic 
whereby, through successive clashes of the logics of hierarchy and equality, the social order 
can become “better”, more open to new ways of being, and doing (Rancière, 1999, p. 41). 
Rancière finds in the very form of human rights, in the inscriptions, the capacity to “set in 
motion the rearticulation of actual socio-economic relations by way of their progressive 
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‘politicization’” (Žižek, 2004). Rancière’s political philosophy is one of practical materialism, 
one of commitment to the material nature and effects of language, discourse, and inscription 
(Deranty, 2003, p.139).  The concept, now enshrined in bourgeois law, “of universal equality 
had to be argued, and fought for, by working and rebelling subjects” (p. 139), and it 
represents a substantial advance. There is a place in Rancière analysis for the development of 
a progressive dialectic of rights claims and law: He recognizes that moral and historical 
progress can be won through the use of inscriptions of rights, and he stresses the importance 
of the law in securing advances and “in anchoring the recognition of superior levels of 
universality and equality within a community” (Deranty, 2003, p. 148).  
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The notion of the Rights of Man, for Rancière, has two facets: on the one side there are 
“written rights” as inscription of equality and freedom, and on the other the “rights of those 
who make something of that inscription, deciding not only to 'use' their rights but also to 
build cases to verify the power of the inscription” (Rancière, 2010, p. 68). There is a 
“superficial similarity” (Ingram, 2008, p. 412) here with the dialect of de jure and de facto 
equality that Habermas’ identifies in those situations where the state in fact denies rights that 
it grants in law, and where citizens respond by acting on the rights concerned. Rancière goes 
further, however, and shows that the de facto claiming of rights can escape the de jure 
content of the inscription. Human rights inscriptions are then a resource available to all those 
who can make use of them to mount a claim. Most significantly, perhaps, they are a resource 
for those who do not have the right, or do not seem to have it, or have it yet, if they can 
plausibly claim it. As Rancière sees it, this dynamic extension of rights claims proceeds “not 
on the basis of a consensus about rights but precisely through the opposite — through 
dissensus about their meaning, application, and extension” (Ingram, 2008, p.412). 
Rancière wants to give due acknowledgement to the real advances won through political 
struggle, that is to the rights “forced” from bourgeois law (2011, p. 87). Yet he has a far from 
optimistic view of the state of law and politics in modern consensus democracy.  He 
associates consensus with de-politicization; with “closing spaces of dissensus by plugging 
intervals and patching up any possible gaps between appearance and reality, law and fact” 
(2010, pp. 71-72); with processes in which contestable, litigious, human rights, with all of 
their political potential, are neutralized: “turned into real rights - those of real groups with a 
solid identity and a recognized place in the society” (2010, p. 72). For Rancière politics 
disappears in any “regime in which the parties are presupposed as already given, their 
community established and the count of their speech identical to their linguistic performance” 
(1999, p. 102). Rancière’s notion of inscription is central to the articulation of his position. 
The advance of democracy is not linear. Rights secured and institutionalized constitute 
progress, but the moment of institutionalization is also the moment of integration into the 
police order as the other of the political. The political progress of rights might then be best 
conceived of, not as a steady accumulation of progress towards an ideal of say 
communicative reason, but as “a history of singular solutions to the dialectic of equality and 
inequality, a series of locally situated inscriptions of equality into the realm of inequality” 
(Deranty, 2003, p.153). Such inscriptions become institutionalized, “ossified” and lose their 
emancipatory value, but on the other hand, they can be revived in new struggles: “reinscribed 
in new contexts, reinterpreted, rewritten, and so on” (2003, p. 153). 
Democracy as an idea of universal equality is central to Rancière’s conception of politics. 
For him, “(e)very politics is democratic … not in the sense of a set of institutions, but in the 
sense of forms of expression that confront the logic of equality with the logic of the police 
order” (1999, p.  101). Politics for Rancière then always “essentially an eruption of 
democracy” (Bowman, p. 540), the disturbance arising from the claiming of a universal 
equality: There is a clear equation, or line, running between, politics, democracy and equality. 
In the final part of this paper we look more closely at the implications of Rancière thought for 
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social accounting and for accounting for human rights in context of the Ruggie initiative. 
Rancière is very much a radical democrat (see Little & Lloyd, 2009), and we find it useful to 
elucidate the implications of our position through a critical analysis of some features of the 
human rights concepts and policies have hitherto been made to serve the  “economic and 
geopolitical interests of the hegemonic capitalist states”, she recognizes “that the discourse of 
human rights can be articulated also in the defence of the oppressed” (2005, p. 125): Like 
Rancière she sees a radical potential even in bourgeois inscriptions of human rights arising 
“out of the fact that the meaning of liberal discourse on individual rights is not definitively 
fixed; and just as this unfixity permits their articulation with elements of conservative 
discourse, it also permits different forms of articulation and redefinition which accentuate the 
democratic moment” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.176).  
Critical accounting scholars seem increasingly to draw on the radical democratic 
tradition in their work. Whilst allegiances to particular theorists, such as Mouffe or Laclau,  
are not always explicitly acknowledged, the spirit of radical democracy is clearly implicit in 
much of the work of scholars such as Gallhofer et al., (2006) who seek to advance the 
possibility of “counter-accounts” as “practices intended to challenge and de-legitimate power 
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work of critical accounting scholars who have drawn inspiration from the work of other 
theorists of radical democracy including Laclau and Mouffe. 
 
Accounting for human rights and the spirit of democracy 
Critical accountants concerned to explore and extend the part that accounting might play in 
supporting political challenge to the dominant order; have increasingly turned to the theorists 
of radical democracy and the frameworks they offer. In the first part of this paper we 
considered the influence Ernesto Laclau on social accounting thought and we hope made our 
essential criticism clear. Whilst there is considerable complementarity in the work of Laclau 
and Rancière, both having clearly “antagonistic” conceptions of politics, we will, in what 
follows, briefly return to that criticism and link it to a key point of difference in their thinking. 
Much of the influence of radical democratic thinking on accounting has come through 
Chantal Mouffe’s work on agonistic democracy. Here the distance from Rancière is greater. 
Agonistic conceptions of democracy have, in recent decades, come to dominate 
“discussions amongst political theorists” (McNay, 2000, p. 67) and have exerted a growing 
influence on the work of thinkers interested in the relation between politics, democracy, and 
accounting; including accounting for human rights. In some cases, such as that of Mouck 
(1995) and Brown and Dillard (2013a & b) the influence on critical accounting thought is 
explicit; in other cases it is implicit. Critical accounting theorists seem especially drawn to 
the agonistic pluralism of Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2000 & 2005). Mouffe’s model of radical 
democracy is built on the framework set out initially in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), where two concepts in particular are identified as necessary for the 
understanding of the nature of the political: “antagonism” and “hegemony” (Mouffe, 2014, p. 
181). From the perspective of agonistic democracy, antagonism is an ineradicable, and in fact 
constitutive, feature of any society and we should appreciate and come to terms with the fact 
that the socio-political order is always a “temporary and precarious” effect of the articulation 
of certain hegemonic practices; always “predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities”.  
We should appreciate that, on this view of things, antagonism is not only an ineliminable 
but a positively desirable feature of society: It opens up the possibility of radical change 
through counter-hegemonic action, through the articulation and re-articulation of practices 
and discourses: It makes every order “susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic 
practices” (p.181). In the final instance Mouffe’s radical democracy “is intended to promote 
the inclusion of oppressed groups and expand an understanding of the possibilities for 
emancipatory transformation” (McNay, 2014, p. 68). Whilst Mouffe would insist that the 
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relations in order to mobilise change agendas in social movements” (Thomson et al., 2015, in 
press). Sikka (2011) takes the call for counter-accounts directly to the accounting and human-
rights sphere. He calls for “the production of counter accounts to challenge the hegemony of 
corporations and create spaces for the enjoyment of human rights” (p. 811). As with so much 
of the work in this area considerable emphasis is put on the role that accounting and 
accounting researchers can play “in advancing novel discourses, giving visibility to the plight 
of the marginalised people” (p. 824). By doing so, Sikka argues accounting can “ferment 
possibilities of emancipatory change” (p. 825). Lauwo and Otusanya (2014) argue that in 
order to “address the challenges of corporate accountability and responsibility to human 
rights issues”, there is a need to reform the neo-liberal governance mechanisms and 
institutions that have for so long produced and “reproduced social and environmental 
injustices and human rights abuses” (p.104). Their recommendation is reform of governance 
mechanisms to give more voice to the marginalized, to create a space in which a “wide array 
of stakeholders’ concerns and needs” can be expressed; and through which the dominant 
capitalist hegemony and its goals of “short-term profits and shareholder wealth maximisation” 
can be challenged (p. 104). 
Cooper et al., (2011) focusing on the health and safety dimension of human rights and on 
the circumstances of a particular industrial accident, make a case for the production of 
alternative, counter-hegemonic, forms of accounts: “re-presenting internally derived 
information on which companies are ‘silent’ and external ‘shadow’ accounts reflecting on the 
performance of the company” (p. 741). In the particular case this is expressed as a need for a 
re-articulation of corporate health and safety accounting, responding to the interests of, and 
giving voice to, civil society and workers and their representatives: the “Scottish Hazards 
Advice Centre, workers and trade unions” (p. 756).  
Gallhofer et al., (2011) locate the emergence and appeal of human rights in a post war 
concern to protect the “marginalized against the power of majorities” (p. 766). They identify 
indigenous peoples as marginalised, and in common with a number of other accounting 
theorists, including Gallhofer et al. (2000) argue for an accounting that better protects and 
advances the rights of such groups by giving them voice. They argue, in particular, for more 
holistic accounts consistent with “indigenous principles” (p. 774). Gallhofer et al. (2011) take 
some direct inspiration from Laclau and Mouffe’s work in their recommendation of the 
“challenging of official/hegemonic accounts by unofficial/counter hegemonic accounts” 
(p.770). They go on to make the interesting suggestion that the language of accountability 
could play a role in the forging of “equivalential links between or hegemonic articulations of 
various particular emancipatory interests and demands” (p. 770). 
Just as Srnicek & Williams (2015, p. 5) argue that many of the folk political “tactics on 
the contemporary left have taken on a ritualistic nature, laden with a heavy dose of fatalism”, 
we find more symbolism than substance in some of these somewhat forlorn, invocations of 
the counter-hegemonic potential of new articulations of accountability; counter accounts, 
shadow accounts, silent accounts, and so on, even when connection is made to human rights. 
Furthermore, the prevailing order seems quite untouched by them. Spence (2007) finds a 
tenacious dominance of “the business case” for social and environmental reporting (SER) in 
the discourse of practitioners; suggesting the limited development of any counter-hegemonic 
movement around the practice of social and environmental reporting. It is vital, from the 
“agonistic” perspective, of course, that the political scene be vigorous and that there be a real 
possibility of social change through political struggle counter hegemonic action. Spence et al., 
(2010) suggest that the relative ineffectiveness of SER in making any significant challenge to 
the established order, can in part be traced to the fact that the theoretical discourse of SER 
lacks real political content, and has been unable to effectively articulate itself with other 
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counter-hegemonic interests. It is isolated and politically empty: stripped of political import 
and reduced to a “
5  Equality as a concept is of course is not lacking in Laclau and Mouffe understanding of democracy. From the outset 
(1985), they associate the emergence of modern politics with the democratic revolutions and the growing recognition 
that power is something that no one has a privileged claim on: we are all equally entitled to struggle (see Bowman, 
2007, p. 543). 
6  Laclau’s “perfect” theorisation of politics “conceived as hegemony” (2004, p. 326), yields “a contingent description of 
a contingent state of affairs, rather than an analytical theory of the political as the occasional eruption of democratic 
disorder in always oligarchical social arrangements” (Bowman, 2007, p. 543). 
7
  Mouffe (2005) suggests that a distinction can usefully be drawn between ‘politics’’ and ‘‘the political’: “If we wanted 
to express such a distinction in a philosophical way, we could,  borrowing the vocabulary of Heidegger, say that 
politics refers to the ‘‘ontic’’  level while ‘‘the political’’ has to do with the ‘‘ontological’’ one. This means that the 
ontic has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics, while the ontological concerns the very way in 
which society is instituted” (pp. 8-9). Rancière has no use for this distinction (see Bowman, 2007, p. 541). 
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merely technical, administrative project” (Spence et al., 2010, p. 77).  
We suggest that the lack of political direction can be traced to the essential contingency 
of the conception of hegemony. We previously noted the equation in Rancière’s thinking 
between, politics, democracy and equality. Analogously in Laclau we have politics as 
hegemony. We lack then the firm grounding in universal equality that Rancière insists on and 
which entirely guides his conception of politics. With Laclau, for that matter Mouffe, we lack 
the grounding and politics is entirely a matter of the contingent play of power,5 politics is 
hegemony and hegemony “utterly contingent, hence irreducibly populist” (Bowman, 2007, p. 
543).6 We can then put the lack of political direction which, we discussed in the first part of 
this paper and alluded to above, into a theoretical perspective and see that, despite the hopes 
of theorists such as Spence (2009), Laclauian politics fundamentally lacks the necessary 
resources. 
Turning from Laclau antagonistic politics to Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism our 
reservations only increase. For Mouffe politics, as she conceives of it, “aims at the creation of 
unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” 
by the determination of a “them” (2000, p. 15).7 Mouffe puts emphasis on the need to manage 
the antagonism that is the constitutive ground of politics, and in so doing achieve a degree of 
democratic institutional stability within which politics can go on. As she sees it, “the aim of 
democratic politics is to construct the “them” in such a way that it is no longer perceived as 
an enemy to be destroyed, but an “adversary”, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but 
whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 15). The 
aim of democratic politics, as she sees it “is to transform antagonism into agonism” (Mouffe, 
2000, p. 16), the expression of which will be compatible with the practice of liberal 
democracy. 
A crucial difference, for us, between the positions taken by Mouffe and Rancière, is in 
their designation of the domain of the politics.  For Mouffe there is politics to be done within 
the social order. In order to get the work done she thinks it is important that some degree of 
stability is achieved; a hegemonically constituted stability, of course: Mouffe then we might 
say, is “more on the side of those who see democratic politics as ‘archic’ rather than 
‘anarchic.’  (Biesta, 2011, p. 144). Her agonistic pluralism involves the construction  of an at 
least provisionally stable political scene, within ‘‘shared adhesion to the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy’’ (Mouffe 2000, p. 15): The establishment and maintenance 
of appropriate fora within which values, passions and competing interests can be expressed, 
debated and negotiated; Arenas in which in which marginalized groups given are given entry 
and voice. 
This  archic tendency can be found in the work of accounting theorists such as Judy 
Brown who have adopted the perspective of agonistic pluralism and explored how “new 
accountings” can “foster” such democracy (2009, p. 313).  That is, “a reconstituted 
accounting capable of incorporating democratic norms” (p. 315). Brown builds a “framework 
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for a critical dialogic approach to accounting” (p. 324), the architecture of which she 
elaborates around eight principles. In the model which Brown offers, the accountant as expert 
has a key part to play in facilitating “wide-ranging dialogue among stakeholders” (p. 329). 
Stakeholders need to be helped to become fit for democracy, to be fit political subjects, able 
to engage effectively in an agonistic democracy; a stable democracy that does not collapse 
into antagonism. Brown (p. 321) follows Mouffe in imagining a particular kind of democratic 
subject; one socialized in “identification with democratic values” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 11), and 
both are clear that “(u)nderstandings that reject liberal democratic values” are to be “excluded” 
(Mouffe, p. 9; Brown, p. 323). The political subject, for Mouffe and Brown, must learn to 
play by the rules or face exclusion. Marginalized groups, of perhaps indigenous people, will 
require expert help to become the effective political subjects, of agonistic democracy, that 
Brown’s dialogistic accounting is to be part of: “Stakeholders require assistance to help them 
develop the skills to debate with experts” (p. 326).  
There is considerable sophistication in the vision advanced by Brown. Nevertheless it 
seems to us that its archic features, the concentration on ordering of the political sphere and 
accounting’s role within it, along with its emphasis on the identification and socialization of 
political subjects, stakeholders, those with a place in the social/political order, and interests at 
stake which give them “dialogic entitlements” (Brown, p. 326), all tends towards an eclipse 
of real politics. When turned to a topic such as corporate accountability for human rights, it 
would seem that it must take shape as a new humanitarian approach; A humanitarianism with 
a poststructuralist twist, filled with experts who know, and marginalised groups in need of 
expert help to achieve political agency. 
For Rancière there is no political work, as such, to be done within the police order of 
society. He is careful to maintain the negativity of his position, clearly fearing that a more 
positive position will lead to the contamination of the political with social substance that 
ultimately privileges particular parts, and perspectives, and institutes new exclusions and 
dominations under the guise of neutral socio-political process. This is exactly where we fear 
Mouffe’s liberal democratic agonism leads. For Rancière politics is not a particular kind of 
social order “regime or a social way of life” (Rancière, 1999, p. 101). His politics is 
essentially anarchic, an interruption of the social order arising from the confrontation of the 
logics of hierarchy and equality. It is always firmly grounded in the claiming of equality, it is 
dissensus, understood not in terms of “a conflict of interests, opinions or values” (2010, p. 69) 
but, as “a division inserted in 'common sense'” (2010, p. 69); “the production, within a 
determined, sensible world, of a given that is heterogeneous to it” (2003, p.  226).The 
primary focus of political work, and of political struggle generally as Rancière conceives of it, 
then, cannot be on the struggles between those with a stake or part in society, but will always 
be on issues of recognition, and how subjects come to be present and have a part on the 
political stage; on “the existence of a common stage and over the existence and status of 
those present on it” (Rancière, 1999, pp.  26-27). 
Political dissensus is outside the police/social order in the sense that it is the production 
of “a way of acting and being that cannot be conceived within the particular police order” 
(Biesta, 2011, p. 149). The police order has a kind of completeness: it is “the division of the 
sensible that claims to recognize only real parties to the exclusion of all empty spaces and 
supplements” (Rancière, 2003, p.  226). Political work must overcome the police-principle: 
“this exclusion of what 'is not'” (Rancière, 2010, p.36). It entails the production of new 
political subjectivities, and for that reason Rancière talks of politics as a process of 
subjectification. Politics as subjectification is the means “through which any order of 
distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their "nature" and places corresponding 
to their functions is undermined, thrown back on its contingency” (Rancière, 1999, p.  101). It 
does not rely on the pre-existing subject, coming forward to assert themselves and their 
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interests: “A political subject is not a group that "becomes aware" of itself, finds its voice, 
imposes its weight on society” (Rancière, 1999, p. 40). On the contrary the political subject 
emerges in the political confrontation of the logics of hierarchy and equality: “It is an 
operator that connects and disconnects different areas, regions, identities, functions, and 
capacities existing in the configuration of a given experience – that is, in the nexus of 
distributions of the police order and whatever equality is already inscribed there” (1999, p. 
40).   Rancière gives as an example of political subjectification, the strike where the 
particular issues at stake, such as working hours or work-place health and safety, become 
connected to claims to equality in terms of human rights in such a way that the strike 
becomes a political act: an act in which a police logic and a logic of equality are brought into 
confrontation; an act through which new divisions of the sensible and new political 
subjectivities are established. Such political action can reconfigure the order defining “the 
place and part of work”, so that the private relationship between employer and employee, as 
individuals, can come to “be posited as a collective relationship” and “the private place of 
work be posited as belonging to the domain of public visibility” (Rancière, 1999, p. 40). 
Accounting for human rights, in its various forms, including corporate annual reports 
(see GRI, 2013) and human rights impact assessments (see UN, 2007), can provide context 
for the staging of the political acts, dissensus, and subjectification. The UN Guiding 
Principles bring the inscription of human rights clearly into the business arena. Those 
inscriptions can serve as a basis for political action, and processes of subjectification. 
Accounting for human rights can be a focus for action which challenges the gap between the 
inscription of rights and their realization in the social order, and more importantly, for action 
through which the meaning of rights is progressively extended.8 The human rights 
inscriptions carried by accounts can have a special part to play in the staging of dissensus, 
and particularly in facilitating the articulation of claims to equality, and in the making of 
connections between parts and interests within the social order and fragile traces of equality 
in the social order which “however fragile and fleeting such inscriptions may be” (Rancière, 
1999, p.  40).  
Ruggie’s initiative for us represents progress as it constitutes an advance of the 
inscription of equality in the police order. These are inscriptions that can be progressively 
used and developed in future political action; democratic action and political subjectification, 
enabling the emergence of new ways of being and acting. In developing the Guiding 
Principles Ruggie and his colleagues have imaginatively extended the space for the staging of 
egalitarian claims. They have boldly broken with dogma of statism, the idea that “that human 
rights impose obligations exclusively or principally on states”, and with the dogma of 
legalism, the notion “that human rights, even if they are not themselves fundamentally legal 
standards, are to be implemented exclusively or principally through the medium of 
(enforceable) law” (Tasioulas, 2015).  At the heart of the Guiding Principles is an emphasis 
on the embedding of a consciousness of human rights through due diligence and a clear 
appreciation of the need for interpretation and dialogue concerning what corporate respect for 
human rights requires. The Guiding Principles make it clear that respect for human rights 
should not be limited by law. Ruggie indicates the influence of Amaryta Sen and insists that 
we should not allow law to “incarcerate” human rights (2013, p.xxxv). In the Guiding 
Principles there is a spirit of resistance to closure of the meaning of human rights and the 
associated responsibilities of corporations, and some acknowledgment that their meaning will 
need to be negotiated in particular contexts. The Guiding Principles, provide a stage for the 
progressive extension of the equality in the corporate sphere. 
                                                            
8
  The Scottish Human Rights Commission calls for a “progressive interpretation” of the Guiding Principles (SHRC, 
2011), pushing forward what we take to be the common sense meaning of the principles through their application. 
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9
  “The political dispute is distinct from all conflicts of interest between constituted parties of the population” (Rancière, 
1999, p. 99). 
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We are emphasizing in this paper the political, and therefore necessarily anarchic, 
dissensual, potential of accounting for human rights. We recognize, of course, that accounting 
has many parts to play within the social order including its, essentially non-political,9 
function in relation to the negotiation and management of interests. Such functions require an 
accounting architecture of course, but we need to be careful that it lets the political happen. 
Politics relies on the inscriptions and traces of equality found in the social order. It is vital 
that those traces be preserved and that our accountings allow those inscriptions to be used to 
support the claims that make new divisions of the order and new ways of being and doing. 
Experts should not be allowed to close the space of accounting for human rights with their 
interpretations of their meaning and significance, and their understanding of which voices 
and which groups have a stake and should be listened to. We should trust in the equality and 
agency of those without a part and listen to and possibly amplify their claims to equality, 
their disputing of wrongs when they arise.   
The architecture of “due diligence” for human rights process promoted by Ruggie (UN, 
2008 and 2011) contains four main steps, each with potential political relevance. The first 
step is that a corporation should adopt a human rights policy. Such policies can become local 
inscriptions of rights that can be used in the raising claims to equality and the making of 
connections in the process of subjectification. A second step is the integration human rights 
policies throughout the organisation. This step can push inscriptions of rights with the traces 
of equality out to remote corners of the organization.  Once disseminated and to some degree 
embedded in the local social order of the organization the inscriptions of corporate 
commitment to human rights, and associated procedures, become a future resource for 
political action. A third element of the due diligence framework is the measurement of impact 
of existing and proposed activities. Ruggie makes it clear that the assessment of impact will 
entail investigation involving engagement with communities: These assessments can become 
the occasion for the staging of political action, the staging of confrontations and the 
revelation of contradictions. They can be the focus for dispute over wrongs which connects 
particular interests and places in the social order with claims of equality. The disputes they 
can crystallize and carry can be a powerful medium in which subjectification, new ways of 
being and acting can arise. The final element is the tracking and audit of human rights 
performance. In the reports generated we have new inscriptions, and new publicity for 
commitment to human rights and another locus for political action. 
It is tempting to be cynical about corporate “commitments” to human rights, and 
suspicious of human rights policy statements, and impact assessments: The gap between the 
fine words and the reality can indeed be large. The corporate discourse of human rights can 
sometimes seem like mere lip service. However, it is vital to keep in mind that it is exactly in 
the form of rights that Rancière locates their power: the “empty formalism of rights 
discourse …, far from being a central shortcoming, is in fact precisely what gives it a radical, 
contestatory force” (McNay 2014, p. 148).  
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